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LOYAL OPPOSITION AND THE 
EPISTEMOLOGY OF CONSCIENCE 
WILLIAM ]. ABRAHAM 
A crucial question which generally faces all rational minorities or individuals who 
do not fit into the intellectual mainstream is this: how do they justify the moral 
claims that they advance in the face of opposition and even ridicule? In other words, 
how do they make good their claims in the teeth of widespread contrary opinion?1 
In this exploratory paper I shall argue that one of the best ways to respond to this is 
by a theory of conscience. En route to this I shall attempt two other tasks. First, I 
shall briefly indicate why it is a good thing to have some kind of theoretical base for 
our minority reports. Second, I shall draw attention to the weaknesses of four com-
mon ways of dealing with the epistemic status of minority opinion. On the other 
side of my proposals concerning conscience, I shall conclude with a brief comment 
on the role of conscience in the empowerment of Christian minorities. 
In posing the issue in the sharp manner represented by my opening question, I 
am not assuming that what is right is determined by majority opinion. That thesis is 
so obviously mistaken that there is no need to argue the negative case involved. 
What is at stake is more subtle than this, and it is more profound. What we want to 
know revolves around a series of concerns which are naturally directed towards 
those who stand outside the mainstream. How do they know they are right? What 
warrant do they have for their proposals? What ground(s) do they have for their 
confidence? 
A clear example that comes to mind is the predicament faced by John Wesley 
and the early Methodists who challenged the prevailing theology, spirituality, morali-
ty, and evangelistic practices of the Anglican tradition of the eighteenth century. 
Wesley and his friends faced a barrage of objections which sooner or later had to be 
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answered. Once this process began, they were driven to deal with the whole range of 
fundamental questions w hich lie below the surface of the initial controversies. This is far 
from being a merely political or prudential operation, for in time new insights emerge or 
old truths are rediscovered; invariably a whole new tradition arises to enrich our ecclesial 
and cultural life. 
To be sure, a good case can be made that all opinions must face this kind of query soon-
er or later, for majorities as much as for those in the position of the loyal opposition. 
Moreover, there is a long and distinguished school in epistemology which has insisted that 
we can know nothing, including nothing in the field of morality, unless we have first estab-
lished our position on a sound basis. Hence foundationalists of one kind or another have 
long maintained that nobody, not even an intelligent majority, has the right to claim they are 
correct unless they can logically trace their position back to adequate foundations represent-
ed by self-justifying or secure premises, axioms, first principles, and the like. Immanuel Kant's 
categorical imperative and John Stuart Mill's principle of utility seek to provide precisely such 
a secure foundation. Hence on at least one reading of our epistemic situation, everybody, 
and not only minorities, is required to explain and justify their position. 
However, no such theory lies behind the present request for warrants. Moreover, it 
would be question-begging to rest on such a set of assumptions. What some minorities 
rightly will want to challenge is this whole approach to the foundations of morality. It is 
precisely this challenge against a central feature of the modern Enlightenment which puts 
them outside the mainstream in the first place. Hence they will correctly protest that their 
position is the kind of radical position that calls this line of inquiry into question. We had 
better have other reasons for pressing the issue before us than merely an appeal to some 
kind of classical foundationalism. 
It is also worth noting that in some quarters the very idea of suggesting that minorities 
of any sort should be asked to give an account of their proposals of the kind envisaged 
here is otiose. We are all aware of the extent to which it has become fashionable to see 
this kind of request as a disguised form of oppression or violence; such questioning is per-
ceived as a type of dominance in which those in the majority make demands of the 
minority as a means of keeping challengers out of the discussion and eventually out of 
positions of power.2 
Not all minorities are prepared to take up this kind of defensive posture. For example, 
it is more than significant that many Evangelicals are extremely reluctant to playa card of 
victimization by oppression. There can be no doubting the historical reality behind their 
systematic exclusion from the academy and from crucial centers of power within main-
line Protestant churches. Mature observers can readily identify the academic, poli tical, and 
theological ideologies which have been developed to provide intellectual explanations for 
such exclusion. In these circumstances there is great temptation to take on the status of 
the victim and seek to gain power on the basis of past discrimination and exclusion. Some 
have succumbed to this strategy, but I suspect that it is thoroughly uncharacteristic of the 
Evangelical tradition as a whole. At least two important convictions underlie this hesita-
tion . 
First, Evangelicals deep down are committed to the search for truth as a logically distinct 
value or good which cannot be reduced to political or social interest. This is deeply incom-
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patible with any move which would make the formal commitment to truth equivalent to a 
quest for power. To be sure, Evangelicals are only too aware that the reality is often differ-
ent.) Human beings, especially those in positions of power, all too easily can dress up the 
quest for dominance and power in the form of a quest for truth. Any tradition which takes 
sin seriously will be aware of such possible self-deception. However, the very claim that 
such self-deception is possible or actually has happened is a claim to truth which cannot be 
reduced to one more quest for power if we are to take it seriously. Hence any global theo-
ry of truth which reduces truth itself to power is self-referentially destructive. 
Secondly, Evangelicals have learned over the years that the social institutions of the 
church and society depend on confessional claims which need to be sustained across the 
generations. These confessional claims are held to embody not just the reality of majority 
victory or the attainment of raw power; they are taken to embody nothing less than the 
revealed truth of Cod. Hence Evangelicals have very deep theological warrants for refus-
ing to play the ideological card of victimization when they are hard pressed to do so by 
the example of other minority groups in the neighborhood. 
Why, then, do we raise this deep question of warrant at all and present it as especially 
acute for minorities? On a general level we raise the matter because a rejection of foun-
dationalism does not for one moment mean the end of the debate concerning the justifi-
cation of moral claims. All it signals is that one way of resolving this complex matter has 
been abandoned. Moral foundationalists, like Kant and Mill, are sometimes wont to be 
perplexed by the rejection of their position. Somehow they think that if we reject their 
position we have rejected morality proper and maybe even epistemology proper. Worse 
still, they may think that we have automatically embraced some sort of relativism or 
nihilism. This is an illusion. All we have abandoned is one family of solutions for questions 
about the deep structure and justification of morality. We have simply rejected an impor-
tant and illuminating alternative in the debate about the foundations of morality. 
Consequently, what we have before us is a tremendous moral and epistemological chal-
lenge. We now have to work out an alternative to what has stood as a prevailing consen-
sus in the field. 
As to the special case of minorities, there are three considerations which relate to their 
responsibilities. First, because they stand outside the mainstream, the onus of proof falls 
on them in the dynamic of debate. At the very least there is psychological and social pres-
sure to explain their position. Indeed it is this sort of pressure which makes minorities 
such a valuable part of the social order. Often they provide the alternatives which are 
needed when the mainstream becomes exhausted. They constitute a kind of monastic 
renewal for the wider world they inhabit. Moreover, the vigor and urgency with which 
they usually present their claims can open up the issues and provide new perspectives in 
a refreshing manner. 
Secondly, the courtesies of debate require that they explain the deeper convictions 
that lie behind their position. After all, the majority hold the territory in part because in 
years gone by they won the debate about the field as a whole. They earned the right to 
be heard because once upon a time they delivered the relevant goods. Indeed at one 
time they probably were the minority opinion. Hence the onus is now on the relevant 
minority to come through with the intellectual goods. 
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Thirdly, without some kind of critical check or some kind of reasoned account of their 
position, those in opposition repeatedly fall into various forms of fanaticism. They simply 
end up in the position of the dogmatist or zealot who requires us to take what they say as 
correct merely on their word. This helps nobody in the debate. It puts the opposition in 
the awkward position of having nothing substantial to say beyond repeating the point at 
issue; it prevents the majority from benefiting from the serious discussion of an altemative 
scenario; and, worst of all, it misses a golden opportunity to advance our understanding of 
the logic and justification of moral claims. 
Christian minorities have an additional incentive to develop their position. They owe it 
as constitutive of their love of their neighbor. To misuse a standard text in apologetics, 
they have a duty to give a reason for the hope that is within them. They are called to 
think through and share their convictions so that the Cod they serve may be glorified and 
honored. In the past they have generally seized on this option gladly. 
This does not mean that it is easy. There is always the temptation to take the line of 
least resistance and find an excuse to avoid answering hard questions or to short circuit 
the debate by turning the whole issue into an affair of sociology and politics. The latter is 
all too visible when the debate is transformed into a power struggle to be resolved by 
votes, caucuses, intrigue, and the like. Political action is always inescapable and sociologi-
cal analysis is generally invaluable; yet without the patient attending to the moral, theolog-
ical, and philosophical considerations which swirl around the discussion, the results can be 
socially disastrous. Such debate is not a substitute for war or violence; it may at times be 
part of the cure for our social and ecclesiastical strife. 
II 
Let me pursue now our query in a quasi-historical manner. How might a loyal opposi-
tion resolve the question of the warrants for its position? Let us look very briefly at four 
possibilities. They involve in turn an appeal to one's identity in a community, to divine 
revelation, to intuition, and to empowerment. 
In the first case we envisage that the grounding of one's decisions go back to one's for-
mation in a community. Thus the minority may simply appeal to its membership in a 
community; it appeals to its identity in a particular tradition, group, or class. On the sur-
face this appears a hopelessly simplistic solution to our problem. However, it would be a 
mistake to take it simplistically. What usually underlies the appeal to community is a 
much wider story about the human condition, about the formation of our moral identity, 
about the nature of human community itself, about the character of morality, and about 
the virtues and vices identified by a community in the pursuit of its preservation and wel-
fare. It is precisely because the appeal to community can be spelled out to embrace such 
a rich network of material that it has become exceedingly attractive of late. 
Unfortunately, this richness does not begin to deal with the fundamental objection that 
is naturally lodged against it. The chief problem with this proposal is that we want to 
know how we can be sure that our favored community is right. Explaining in great detail 
the various elements which are buried in this option does not begin to grapple with this 
problem, for the same question will break out with respect to these claims too. All along 
the line the critic will want to know: "What are the warrants for the particular claim or set 
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of claims proposed by the community in question?" Clearly this takes us right back to 
where we started. 
Alternatively, as a second possibility, the minority might appeal to divine revelation. In 
this instance one's position is grounded in what God has revealed, say, in Scripture or in 
Christ. The warrant is the fact that God has spoken definitively and has made known 
what we should morally do; or, less strongly, we can infer what we ought to do from 
what God has told us to do. However, in this case, too, problems immediately surface. 
First, questions will arise as to which revelation should be used. Which of the many 
putative revelations available should one accept as genuine? Unless this question is 
resolved, one will be at a loss as to how to proceed. Secondly, and more importantly, 
even if this issue is resolved, we will have to face the age-old question developed in tanta-
lizing fashion by Plato in the Euthyphro. Granted that we now know what God requires 
of us, does God require action 'x' because it is good, or is 'x' good because it is required 
by God. If we take the first option, then morality is logically independent of religion, and 
we do not need to appeal to divine revelation to ground our moral claims. If we take the 
second option, the foundations of morality become purely arbitrary, for our moral claims 
are decided by the whim of the deity without there being any moral constraints on what 
can be deemed as required even by God. 
If we cannot appeal to community or revelation as the way ahead, then what about an 
appeal to intuition? Here we meet a third epistemic scenari04 This would fit very naturally 
with our quest, for it is characteristic of minorities to take a stand at a very deep level on 
their convictions. In the end they often claim just to see the truth of what they are pro-
claiming. There is nothing below their claim on which it rests. As the legendary Luther put 
it in his famous phrase, "God help me, I can do no other." This strategy would fit nicely 
with the reluctance to argue. In this analysis there is no argument; arguments presuppose 
fundamental premises or axioms which in the nature of the case are taken for granted; so 
it would be futile to argue for their acceptance. In other words, it is the very expression of 
these fundamental premises or axioms which are at issue on this reading of the situation. 
These are seen to be true intuitively; they need no demonstration or support. 
Once again it is not difficult to identify the difficulties with this sort of strategy. As the 
history of the debate about the value of intuitionism shows, critics have latched on to two 
primary objections. First, intuitionists are generally divided on the kind of propositions 
which they profess to see. Some see particular instances and then from these attempt to 
build general rules. Others claim to intuit the general rules and then apply them to partic-
ular cases. If intuition is a reliable faculty, there should be no such deep disagreement 
between those committed to its use. This defect in the formalties of what is perceived is 
then further compounded by the second objection. When we move from the formal to 
the material content of the supposed perceptions, we find even more disagreement. 
Intuitionists notoriously see different propositions to be true, whether the propositions 
have as their subject general rules or particular cases. They cannot agree on which cases 
genuinely count as examples of good or evil action or on which rules embody good or 
bad principles. In these circumstances, it is extremely tempting to look for non-rational 
causes of the beliefs of intuitionists, say, in terms of gender or class analysis. 
A fourth altemative is to ground one's proposals in the fact that they will be instrumental 
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in bringing about the empowerment of the oppressed or the marginalized. Here one argues 
that the ultimate norm or warrant for action is the potential changes embodied in the moral 
action proposed; the envisaged changes are constituted by the liberation or full personhood 
of the victimized group. However, once again, difficulties meet us at every tum. 
First, this proposal rests on projected predictions which are precarious in the extreme. 
Merely because someone says that a particular moral stance will liberate some group or 
other is no guarantee that such a moral stance will actually do the job envisaged. We 
need some sort of empirical generalization or evidence that things will turn out as we 
think. Secondly, this option surrenders the epistemic value of our moral claims. It treats 
moral proposals as purely instrumental, as a means to an end, thus stripping them of any 
categorical content. Finally, this alternative begs the questions from the outset. It already 
assumes that we know that the end in view is morally obligatory, and it does this without 
tell ing us why we should take this as a given. [t does not secure this end as justified or 
warranted. Note that the objection here is not that the end may not be in fact morally 
obligatory; on the contrary, it may well be morally required. The objection is that we have 
not advanced one whit in knowing whether the proposed liberation is morally obligatory. 
The obvious lessons to be learned from this review is that any account of the warrants 
for our moral claims are likely to be highly ramified. Even though I have raised questions 
about the viability of each option, I do not at all hold that they should be rejected in toto. 
To the contrary, I want to suggest that each of them may well have a contribution to 
make to any comprehensive account of our moral existence. The challenge is to develop 
the kind of rich vision which will do justice to the relevant insights hidden in these pro-
posals, while at the same time facing up to the epistemic queries with which we began 
our deliberations. Moreover, we need a central concept which can enable us to bring 
these insights together in coherent and natural manner. I suggest that we can make 
progress in this by deploying and developing the idea of conscience. 
III 
The root idea of conscience is that we are endowed by Cod with the competence to 
engage in moral discernment. In classical renderings of conscience such discernment has 
characteristically been constituted by our ability to see that we should do good rather 
than evil, a very formal first principle of morality, and by our ability to see what the good 
requires of us in various moral situations, the material content of morality. 
Crucial to this understanding of conscience is the claim that conscience is a capacity 
given to us in creation by God. Minimalist descriptions of conscience as a moral sense, a 
faculty of the soul, the candle of the Lord, the voice of Cod, and the like, are really hope-
lessly reduced accounts of this very substantial metaphysical and theological proposal. 
Even less satisfactory are those accounts of conscience which reduce it to some abstract 
right to dissent from current orthodoxy or establishment opinion. In this case the appeal 
to conscience, seen in such expressions, "Well, I have a right to my conscience on this 
matter," is simply the dogmatic claim of an individual to hold to the contingent opinion of 
the moment. [t does not begin to do justice to the epistemic weight assigned to the con-
cept of conscience in the pre-modern Christian world. 
Few have captured the issue in modern times as forcefully as John Henry Newmans 
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His central points are laid out with characteristic forcefulness . To begin, conscience is root-
ed in a clear doctrine of creation. 
I say, then, that the Supreme Being is of a certain character, which, expressed in 
human language, we call ethical. He has the attributes of justice, truth, wisdom, 
sanctity, benevolence and mercy, as eternal characteristics in his nature, the very 
law of his being, identical with himself; and next, when he became creator, he 
implanted this law, which is himself, in the intelligence of all his rational creatures. 
The divine law, then, is the rule of ethical truth, the standard of right and wrong, a 
sovereign, irreversible, absolute authority in the presence of men and angels .... This 
law as apprehended in the minds of individual men, is called ., conscience'; and 
though it may suffer refraction in passing into the intellectual medium of each, it is 
not therefore affected so as to lose its character of being the divine law, but still has, 
as such, the prerogative of commanding obedience6 
For Newman this view is shared across denominational boundaries. 
When Anglicans, Wesleyans, the various Presbyterian sects in Scotland, and other 
denominations speak of conscience, they mean what we mean, the voice of God in 
the nature and heart of man, as distinct from the voice of revelation. They speak of 
a principle planted within us, before we have had any training, although training 
and experience are necessary for its strength, growth, and formation. They consider 
it a constituent element of the mind, as our perception of our ideas may be, as our 
powers of reasoning, as our sense of order and the beautiful, and our other intellec-
tual endowments. 
Moreover, both Protestants and Catholics recognize the deep and fundamental role 
conscience plays in moral deliberation. 
The rule and measure of duty is not utility, nor expedience, nor the happiness of 
the greatest number, nor state convenience, nor fitness, order, and the pulchrum. 
Conscience is not a long-sighted selfishness, nor a desire to be consistent with one-
self; but it is a messenger from him, who both in nature and in grace, speaks to us 
behind a veil and teaches and rules us by his representatives. Conscience is the abo-
riginal vicar of Christ, a prophet in its informations, a monarch in its peremptoriness, 
a priest in its blessings and anathemas, and, even though the eternal priesthood 
throughout the church could cease to be, in it the sacerdotal principle would 
remain and would have a sway? 
This conception of conscience must be resolutely distinguished from the antagonistic 
accounts proposed by various philosophers. 
We are told that conscience is but a twist in primitive and untutored man; that its 
dictates is an imagination; that the very notion of guiltiness, which the dictate 
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enforces, is simply irrational, for how can there possibly be freedom of the will, how 
can there be consequent responsibility, in that infinite eternal network of cause and 
effect, in which we helplessly lie? And what retribution have we to fear, when we 
have no real choice of good or evil?8 
Equally it must be distinguished from the vulgar conception of conscience often found 
in the popular mind. 
When men advocate the rights of conscience, they in no sense mean the rights of 
the creator, nor the duty to him, in thought and deed of the creature; but the right 
of thinking, speaking, writing, and acting, according to their judgment or their 
humour, without any thought of Cod at all .... Conscience has rights because it has 
duties; but in this age, with a large portion of the public, it is the very right and free-
dom of conscience to dispense with conscience, to ignore a lawgiver and judge, to 
be independent of unseen obligations. It becomes a license to take up any or no 
religion, to take up this or that and let it go again, to go to church, to go to chapel, 
to boast of being above all religions and to be an impartial critic of each of them. 
Conscience is a stern monitor, but in this century it has been superseded by a coun-
terfeit, which the eighteen centuries prior to it never heard of, and could not have 
been mistaken for it, if they had. It is the right of self-will." 
Finally, despite the fact that one's conscience can be distorted and that the very idea of 
conscience can be easily misunderstood in the popular mind, Newman is adamant about 
the finality of the deliberations of conscience in the moral life. For Newman we have" a 
duty of obeying our conscience at all hazards."'o Even the authority of the pope, who for 
Newman is nothing less than the medium of divine revelation, must take second place to 
the authority of conscience. "Certainly, if I am obliged to bring religion into after-dinner 
toasts, (which indeed does not seem quite the thing) I shall drink, - to the pope, if you 
please, - still, to conscience first, and to the pope afterwards."" 
IV 
We can see in these remarks of Newman some of the themes which caught our eye in 
our earlier survey of the options often developed by cognitive minorities in the face of 
opposition. More precisely, we can see a place in the development of our moral existence 
for intuition, for divine revelation, and for community and tradition. 'I What is so attractive 
is the way in which these are held together in a compelling vision of morality. More espe-
cially, Newman's remarks open a door for the application of recent developments in epis-
temology which scarcely got a hearing in Newman's time. Before taking up this latter 
topic, I would like to restate in my own terms the crucial components of the moral vision 
suggested here by Newman. ') It has four central elements. 
I. First, in moral deliberation it is impossible to escape the tracing of our moral deliber-
ations back to basic moral principles, insights, and judgments which form the foundations 
of our moral arguments. In moral debate, there simply comes a point where either we see 
or do not see the rightness of what is before us, whether that be a principle, a particular 
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state of affairs, or a particular moral judgment. There is no further reason or axiom which 
is more basic that we can summon in our attempts to persuade an opponent. We either 
see, or we do not see. This constitutes the natural resemblance there is between a theory 
of conscience and intuitionism. In both what is envisaged is a basic capacity, a fundamen-
tal competence, a non-reducible ability to know what is the case morally speaking. 
2. In a developed theory of conscience, this capacity is construed in theistic categories. 
Conscience is understood as given by an all-good and almighty Creator who has made 
human beings in his own image and has thus transmitted to them his own capacity to 
know what is good and evil. This immediately provides a deep warrant for taking con-
science with the utmost seriousness. Because conscience is given by God, to go against 
conscience is to rebel against the voice of God given to us by nature in creation. More 
positively, to obey conscience is to fulfill one's destiny as a creature designed to operate in 
a certain way by one's Creator. 
Given the way that the nature of conscience is embedded in a theistic universe, it is not 
at all surprising that the very idea of conscience should become suspect or even be trans-
formed beyond all recognition, once the theistic universe it inhabits is abandoned. Thus we 
should expect thorough-going secularists, whether Marxists or Durkheimians or Freudians, 
to provide a radically different construal of what theists will identify as conscience. They 
will see the deliberations of conscience as merely the outcome of economic, social, and 
psychological forces which have no causal relation to truth. Hence they will reject the 
deliberations of conscience as radically misguided. Now, to be sure, if we knew that these 
secularist positions were metaphysically correct, then this consequence would follow. In 
reality, however, these remain at best thoroughly contested proposals; a mature theist will 
have her own reasons for rejecting them or for accepting them only in a deeply modified 
form. 14 Moreover, as a theist, she will have her own reasons for adopting a theistic concep-
tion of the universe. Hence the minimalist, reduced accounts of conscience so popular in 
current philosophical and popular circles will be rejected as radically inadequate. 
3. In this account of conscience, conscience is construed in thoroughly dynamic terms. 
It is not an all-or-nothing capacity. It is a divinely given competence which clearly devel-
ops in infancy, through adolescence, and beyond. Conscience can be hurt and healed; it 
can be distorted and sharpened; it can be lost and regained; it can be dulled and 
renewed. Hence a full description of the growth and inner dynamic of conscience is an 
extraordinary achievement. Moreover, any attempt to plot the relation, say, between con-
science, intellect, sentiment, guilt, remorse, and the like, will be a major undertaking 
requiring exquisite perceptual and conceptual skill. 
4. Fourth, it is precisely because conscience is construed as a capacity or as a compe-
tence that it can be corrected and healed by divine revelation and rightly influenced, for 
good or ill, by tradition and community. 
Thus Christian theists will insist that the ultimate norm of good is revealed in the life 
and work of Jesus Christ, the etemal Son of God. In him are hidden the full riches of holi-
ness. Through the working of the Holy Spirit, fellowship with Christ in the body of the 
church so heals and enriches human agents that eventually they share the very mind of 
Christ and see the world as he does. ls Hence the Christian looks to the saints of the 
church as models of enlightenment to be emulated and consulted on moral issues. In 
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these circumstances the inner voice of Cod enables one to discern the moral authority of 
Christ and his saints; in turn conscience itself is healed and corrected by the Word of Cod 
enshrined in the Scriptures and made fully manifest in Christ. In these circumstances, 
there can be no playing of conscience off against divine revelation. ' 6 Special revelation in 
the Word of Cod confirms, corrects, and deepens the natural revelation given through 
the light which enlightens everyone who comes into the world. '7 From the point of view 
of our moral experience, such transformation is not a quick and easy matter either for the 
individual or for the Christian community. Individuals may need years and the Christian 
church may need centuries before the rightness and wrongness of certain moral claims 
are recognized. Such moral development is entirely natural on this account of our compe-
tence in moral discernment. 
V 
We are now in a position to tackle the last segment of our project. The reader will 
recall that our fundamental concern was ultimately to address queries about warrants 
which naturally arise with the appearance of cognitive minorities. In terms of our vision of 
conscience the question which arises is this: How do we know that appeal to conscience 
provides us with adequate justification or warrant for our moral claims? To this we now 
turn. 
The point of entry is Newman's claim that conscience is ·'a constituent element of the 
mind, as our perception of other ideas may be, as our powers of reasoning may be, as our 
sense of order and the beautiful, and other intellectual endowrnents."' B Newman's sugges-
tion is that we should construe conscience as similar to such other intellectual capacities as 
perception, memory, deductive and inductive reasoning, and the like. Thus, just as we 
have recourse to memory in making judgments about the past, so do we have recourse 
to conscience in making judgments about the moral worth of actions. How does this help 
us in developing our account of conscience so that it addresses the quest for knowledge? 
In recent years epistemologists have been recovering and exploring an approach to 
knowledge in general which is especially pertinent to this issue. From the time of 
Descartes and Locke, the two great pillars of the Enlightenment experiment in epistemol-
ogy, the general tendency has been to construe knowledge in terms of true, justified 
belief. The most troublesome element in this tradition has been the problem of securing 
justification. The favored approach to this matter has been to pursue the quest for justifi-
cation in internalist categories. Thus a person is justified in holding to a particular proposi-
tion, p, if that person has good reason for holding p, and that reason is known to the per-
son as a reason for p. On this analysis justification for a belief is secured by being aware of 
good propositional evidence for that belief. 
An obvious difficulty which attends this proposal is how to secure the foundations of 
one's beliefs. After all, every time one cites a reason for any belief, that reason itself consti-
tutes a further belief, and questions will naturally arise about the status of that belief. 
Justification, on this view, becomes a chain of inference and argument which either goes 
on forever or which must come to a halt at an appropriate foundation . In moral theory 
intuitionism represents an attempt to stop the infinite regress of argument by insisting that 
at some point the agent just sees something to be the case. Not surprisingly, philosophers 
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have seen such a move as empty theorizing, as a kind of intellectual hand-waving to flag 
down questions. Equally, attempts to speak of a moral sense, of a faculty of discernment, 
and the like, have been construed as vacuous proposals which verbally fool their propo-
nents into thinking that they are making epistemic progress. In this intellectual environ-
ment a theory of conscience will appear thoroughly dubious. 
However, in recent years we have become acutely aware that all is far from well with 
this kind of internalist account of justification and its attendant account of knowledge. 
Thus many have turned of late to explore an alternative, externalist account of knowl-
edge which proceeds in a radically different direction. The crux of the turn is this. Rather 
than look for propositional evidence, say, for our basic perceptual or mernory beliefs, we 
ask a very different question. We ask if the practice of memory or the practice perception 
is a reliable one. If it is, then we can prima faoe take the beliefs which arise from such 
practices as knowledge. This conceptual shift utterly transforms the way we think about 
knowledge and justification. 
It also transforms the way we should weigh the epistemic status of conscience. On the 
old internalist model the question we asked was how we could find further propositional 
evidence for those beliefs arising from conscience. On this analysis the concept of con-
science was useless. On the new externalist model we ask if we have good reason for tak-
ing conscience to be reliable. Once we ask that question, the answer is obvious. For the 
Christian theist the answer clearly must be yes. Conscience is a God-given capacity; it is a 
constituent part of our nature given by a gracious and loving God. Hence, other things 
being equal, conscience is a reliable medium of moral knowledge. It is this simple and rev-
olutionary notion which makes manifest the extraordinary epistemic significance of con-
science. Prima facie, conscience is to be trusted to yield knowledge because it is a basic 
competence given to us by God. 19 
A consequence of this analysis is worth noting. On the internalist account of knowl-
edge, one can only know something if one also knows how one knows. Thus I know p, if 
and only if I believe p, if p is true, if p is justified, say, by q, if I know q, and if I know that 
q justifies p. The obvious problem with this analysis is that it eliminates a host of things 
which most normal people would insist they knew. For instance a child can know that it 
is raining, or my dog can know that she is about to go for a walk without satisfying such 
stringent conditions. On the externalist account one knows p if one has arrived at p 
through a reliable process. It is not at all essential that one also know how or why the 
process is reliable, although clearly knowing why the process is reliable may enhance 
one's epistemic status. It is precisely this feature of our externalist account of conscience 
which shows why conscience has been taken so seriously in the Christian tradition. Even 
the conscience of the unbeliever, that is, the deliberations of one who may explicitly deny 
its divine origin, is to be taken seriously. The reason for this is that one may well know 
moral truth even though one may not know how one knows such truth. Just as through 
perception I may know immediately that it is snowing, even though I may not have a 
clue how to defend the reliability of perception, equally through conscience I may know 
immediatedly that it wrong to roast people for fun, even though I may not have a clue 
about where my conscience comes from or why it should be normally relied on in my 
moral deliberations. 
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In conclusion we can now connect this account of conscience to the empowering of 
Christian minorities. We noted earlier that the concept of conscience has had a precarious 
place in the moral theorizing of the last two centuries. As Newman rightly suggested, both 
philosophical and popular conceptions of conscience in his day totally failed to convey 
the full force of the idea as developed in the Christian tradition. Since then the situation 
has not improved; on the contrary, the progressive secularization of Western culture has 
made talk of conscience even more precarious than it was in the nineteenth century. 
With the increasing secularization of the Church, it is now common to find the idea of 
conscience treated as a hostile stranger even within its sacred precincts. As Christendom 
collapses, and as mainline churches loosen their intellectual moorings from Scripture and 
tradition, then those committed to talk of conscience and to its healing by the grace of 
Jesus Christ will become even more of a minority than they have been in the past. The 
gap between the working conscience of serious believers and their neighbor is likely to 
grow wider and wider. 
In these circumstances retrieving the riches of the tradition buried in and around the 
idea of conscience is a salutary exercise in at least two ways. First, it wi ll help keep alive 
the Christian tradition in bleak and difficult times. One cannot take conscience seriously 
without also taking seriously a whole range of theological themes and convictions which 
naturally circle round it. Secondly, it will put heart into Christians as they live and witness 
in a hostile environment. At one level a sound grasp of the nature and role of conscience 
wi ll give intellectual and spiritual protection from the moral degeneration which is so 
clearly visible in the world around us. At another level it will help Christians cultivate a 
deep respect for the neighbor. On the reading of the human situation proposed here, 
even enemies are to be respected and heard. Even though one's opponents may be radi-
cally different in outlook, even though from a Christian perspective they may be corrupt 
in their conscience, and even though they may be totally opposed to a theistic account of 
conscience, they are to be treated as agents made in the image of God who can always 
be redeemed and transformed- or as Newman says, they are to be urged to obey their 
conscience against all hazards. In the meantime Christians can draw on the full resources 
of grace made available in the gospel and in the teachers and members of the church. 
Among the latter I am pleased to acknowledge my deep gratitude to Professor Robert 
Lyon whose strong and sensitive conscience as a scholar, as a teacher, and as Christian 
believer leaves so many of us in his debt. 
NOTES 
I . I limit my concern here to moral claims. Our question easily can be extended to encom-
pass theological and other claims. 
2. This is so much a part of the contemporary mainline academic scene that documentation 
would be superfluous. It has become so embedded in some circles that merely to question the new 
status quo will be seen in terms of backlash. See for example, Susan Thistlethwaite's "Beyond dual-
ism: Rosemary Radford Ruether's New Women/ New Earth," The Christian Century (April 24, 
1993): 339-402. 
3. George Marsden's work on the secularization of the academy and on the history of funda-
mentalism are especially helpful treatments of aspects of this theme. See George M. Marsden, 
Loyal Opposition and the Epistemology of Conscience I 47 
Refonning Fundamentalism: A History of Fuller Theological Seminary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987) 
and George M. Marsden and Bradley L. Longfield, eds., The Secularization of the Academy (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
4. Note that I am using "intuition" here as almost a technical term in moral philosophy. I do 
not mean by intuition some kind of non-rational hunch. On the contrary, intuition is intended to 
signify the kind of rationality appropriate to morality. 
5. John Henry Newman, Certain Difficulties Felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching Considered 
(London: Pickering, 1976), pp. 246-26 1. 
6. Ibid., p. 246. 
7. Ibid., pp. 248-249. 
8. Ibid., p. 249. 
9. Ibid., p. 250. 
10. Ibid., p. 259. 
I I. Ibid., p. 26 I. 
12. I leave aside for the moment any reference to empowerment. 
13. Needless to say the account which follows will be much more Protestant in orientation and 
content than what one will find in Newman. 
14. Some modern Protestant treatments of conscience all too readily succumb to the implica-
tions of entirely secular, non-theistic conceptions of human agents at this point. See, for example, C. 
Ellis Nelson, Don't Let Conscience Be your GUIde (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1978), 
15. This is beautifully captured in Romans 12: 1-4. 
I 6. That we may be tempted to do this, that is, insist on one and only one source of moral 
e nlightenment, in this case either conscience or Christ, is part of the legacy of standard 
Enlightenment epistemologies, such as we find in Descartes, which posit one final, certain source of 
moral inquiry. In a sense there is ultimately only one source for the theist, namely the creative activi-
ty of the living God. However, it is an elementary truth of Christian theology that the triune God's 
creative activity is not confined to conscience. 
17. John 1:9. 
18. Newman, Difficulties, p. 248. 
19. It is worth noting that Descartes makes exactly the same epistemic suggestion with respect 
to ordinary perception. See for example his Meditations on First Philosophy (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 
1980), p. 94. 
